Because of the fast developments in digital and engineering technologies, many methods used to be considered as safe and secure have become increasingly questionable, including signature and stamp for self-identification. For 3D objects, additive manufacturing (3D printing) 1-2 represents a revolution in mechanical engineer, however, will also make counterfeit not only remarkably easier but also drastically faster and cheaper. Digital technology would not provide the ultimate solution, which it has helped to create. For example, the power and utility of cryptographic hash function 3 and prime factorization are based on the hypothesis that parallel computation will not be realized in the near future. Therefore, for longterm security challenges, making hash values with more bits would not provide the final solution. What's unbreakable today might be very different after hundreds and thousands of years. Although data safety over a long period of time is not relevant for most of our daily activities, it could be very critical for proving the authenticity of physical items, e.g. an important document, an art work, or an item of historical significance. Molecular signatures, which can be easily incorporated into various physical objects (e.g. ink, paper, texture, etc), are attractive for developing new certification tools. As novel data storage [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] and encryption medium [11] [12] [13] [14] , DNA possesses high capacity and longevity, and can be amplified and operated biochemically to perform computational tasks [15] [16] [17] [18] . Herein, a signature material combining cryptographic hash function with DNA steganography ( figure 1 and 2a) is proposed. Encrypted DNA materials are added to the item to be certificated as molecular signature. To decrypt the DNAencoded information needs to perform biochemical experiments with specific knowledge (DNA keys), and the revealed DNA information will be used as digital keys. The digital keys will be validated through a cryptographic hash function (e.g. SHA-256 or SHA-512), while the hash values were previously published (Figure 2a) . Therefore, to prove the authenticity of an item, people must be able: i) to extract signature materials from the item; ii) to use a set of DNA keys to generate digital keys experimentally; and iii) to validate the digital keys (Figure 2a) .
As a technology complimentary to digital cryptography to improve data safety, the DNA steganography can be as complex as compute-based algorithms such as SHA-256 and SHA-512. More importantly, decryption of DNA steganography requires to perform biochemical experiments with the physical item of interest in wet labs. This process will be much more labor intensive, thus limiting the use of automated brutal force search, which is drastically easier for silicon-base computation than for wet lab experiments. The DNA steganography method used in the paper possesses a QKD (Quantum Key Distribution)-like function and a self-destructive mechanism (Figure 2b) 14 . QKD is based on the feature that the process of measuring a quantum system disturbs the system [19] [20] . A solution of DNA molecules does not possess the property of quantum superposition. However, if an attempt of measurement can change its composition and leave a permanent trace, the design of DNA steganography can be considered as QKD-like. The QKD-like function and self-destructive feature can prevent un-authorized sample replication, thus prohibiting high throughput testing of the amplified DNA materials. Furthermore, the protocol includes a blockchain mechanism 21 , allowing to improve information safety over time. 
DEC (DNA encrypting constructs) design
As a DNA-based signature material, a DEC contains the information about the DNA keys, which are used to reveal the encrypted digital key (DNA sequence as In in figure 1) . A randomness-incorporating DNA steganography 14 was applied to design the DECs, which needs two types of DNA keys for decrypting each DEC, including a pair of DNA primers and a restriction enzyme (Figure 2b The message In can be revealed through sequencing after digesting the d-DNA with the right restriction enzyme and amplification with the right primers An and Bn. Without the right restriction enzyme pre-treatment (DNA key-2), heating associated with PCR amplification will cause reshuffling among many different d-DNA sequences and i-DNA sequence. Consequently, the restriction site flanked by mismatches cannot be recognized by restriction enzyme. Eventually, this process will leave a permanent trace (QKD-like function) and make the information unreadable (self-destruction), even when the sample is afterwards subjected to the right processing.
This DNA key-2 of the basic DEC format a could be possibly bypassed when a mixture of restriction enzymes is applied, though different enzymes often need different specific buffer conditions. This can be circumvented by including a pseudorestriction site En' in the i-DNA strands, either in the information part or in the primer sequence, as shown in the DEC formats b and g, respectively. To prepare the signature materials of DECs, the synthetic DNA sequences will be premixed with large excess of genomic DNA, which can cover the DECs and prevent them from analysis using next generation sequencing.
Key sizes of DECs
Every DEC has two types DNA keys: Key-1 is the two primers and Key-2 is the restriction enzyme. The optimal length for PCR primers is 18-22 nt. As a very conservative estimation, each prime with > 16 correct nt would be sufficient for PCR and the two primers are equivalent to 4 16 x 4 16 = 64 bits of information. Additionally, people will need the right restriction enzyme for reading the information, which would add an additional > 2 7 -2 8 probability (>7 bit, for about 200 enzymes). As shown in figure 1 , the author's information is encrypted in (64+7) x 5 = 355 bits (Dec1 to DEC5). Not mentioning the laborious and expensive experiments with DNA, such information in their digital form cannot be decrypted through automated brutal force search. With the addition of new DECs to the item to grow the blockchain over time, the resulting system will become increasingly difficult for decryption.
Encoding protocol
The author will add his DECs and the DECs acquired from third parties (e.g. law firm or connoisseur) to the item to be certificated (e.g. DEC1-9 in figure 1) . A third party plays a role similar to block creators (for digital currencies such as bitcoin) and is rewarded for their activities to provide as well as to validate the DECs. To further grow the blockchain, the collectors will add their DECs and the DECs from third parties (e.g. DEC10-16 in figure 1) . The associations between author or collectors with their related third parties will be published. Hash1 is generated with I1-I5 (e.g. through SHA-256 or SHA-512). The new DNA-encoded information, together with the hash value n-1 (figure 3), will be used to generate hash value n. While DNA keys and digital keys will be kept secret (by author, collector, and third party), the hash values will be published. 
Development of blockchain. A) Hash1 is generated with I1-I5. The new digital keys, together with the hash value n-1, will be used to generate hash value n. B-C) Some information will be lost over time. An item that can provide the most complete block chain, in full or the closest agreement with the published records, should be considered with the highest confidence as authentic. For example, the item A' is more likely to be authentic than A''.
The author will generate a set of DECs for his own, as well as acquiring a set of DECs from one or multiple third parties. The author will pass his DNA keys and digital keys, but not those from the third parties, to the collector #1. This will allow future collector (e.g. collector #2) to check the authenticity with the third parties. This is in the interest of the author, because this will prevent the collector #1 to make counterfeits based on the obtained information. The collector #1 will add his DEC, with the option of adding the DECs from one or multiple third parties. The collector #1 will pass the author's and his keys to the collector #2. The collector #1 will not pass the keys from the third parties to collector #2. This is in the interest of the collector #1, because this will prevent the collector #2 to use collector #1's credibility to make counterfeits in the future. A hash value can be generated either by a single digital key (e.g. H(hash4, I12) = Hash5, where H(x) is a hash function) or with multiple digital keys (e.g. H(hash3, I10, I11) = Hash4). The latter is certainly saver than the former.
Discussion
In ancient China, people have developed an elegant method to prove the authenticity of art works, most commonly for paintings and calligraphies. The author put his stamp, often multiple stamps onto the piece. In the following years and centuries, both collectors and connoisseurs will add their stamps to the piece. Because their stamps can also be found in many other documents, they can be cross-referenced with each other. Therefore, the more cross-referencing stamps can be found on a piece, the higher confidence regarding the authenticity will a collector have. Similarly, a blockchain, which leads to the creation of bitcoin and many other digital currencies, is a growing list of records, called blocks, that are linked using cryptography. Each block contains a cryptographic hash of the previous block, a timestamp, and transaction data. The blockchain method is the digital counterpart of the stamp-chain, based on the assumptions that it is very difficult to fake multiple stamps (in ancient time), as well as to reverse password encryption of a one-way hash function (with modern computational power).
Using the protocol described in this paper, the authenticity can be confirmed with the presence of Physical item (e.g. hand-written signature), the biochemical experiments with DNA keys to reveal a set of DNA sequences, as well as the use of the DNA sequences as digital keys to produce the Hash values (P-D-H protocol). The P-D-H protocol allows people to add new DECs, thus increasing security over time. The author can generate a set of DECs as a general signature for all of his works and documents, as well as a set of DECs for a particular item ( figure 3a) . Two different items from the same author will lead to two different block chains, even if the author had signed them with the same set of DECs. Two different items will pass through different collectors, who will add their DECs (from themselves and/or from third parties). Some information will be lost over time: ink will fade, DNA can degrade, and the DNA and digital keys could also be lost when passing through many generations, as well as after closing law firms (as third party). However, the item that can provide the most complete block chains, in full or the closest agreement with the published records, should be considered with the highest confidence as authentic. For example, the item A' (figure 3B) is more likely to be authentic than A'' (figure 3C) as the block chain is relatively more complete for A'. Moreover, the information of early digital and DNA keys (DEC1-9 ® I1-9) are associated with many works from the author, thus have the highest probability to be leaked, allowing forger to fake the signature materials.
DNA sequencing is more error-prone than copying digitally. Nevertheless, very little computational effort would be required to correct a digital key, while the brutal force search for the entire digital key remains impossible. For example, to correct < 3 mistakes in a 100 nt DNA sequence (corresponding to 2 or 4 bits in 200 bits of information) needs less than 300 + 9 x 100C2 = 44850 times of computation.
The DECs have been designed to achieve high safety. For example, the combination of DEC1 to DEC5 generates a 355-bit DNA keys, while the third parties 1-4 produce a 213-bit (Hash2) and a 71-bit (Hash3) DNA keys (figure 1). In the following scenario, their security can be partially compromised by: -Collectors. Collector #1 can fake the author's DEC, but not those from third parties, as well as those from future collectors. For example, collector #1 does not have the 213-bit DNA key (Hash2) and 71-bit DNA key (Hash3).
-de novo decryption. A person (X) who gets the signature materials can analyze it and try to guess the DNA keys. X will have the opportunity to test all possible primers and restriction enzymes (DNA keys) as a whole to find the digital keys. The security is compromised, for example, reducing the 355-bit DNA key associated with hash1 to 5 independent 71-bit DNA keys, though it remains experimentally impossible to perform brutal force search. The randomness-incorporating DNA steganography method used in this paper possesses a QKD-like function and self-destruction feature, thus preventing the amplification of signature materials to perform high throughput testing (brutal force search). Moreover, because the P-D-H protocol possesses a mechanism to increase security over time, newer and safer DNA steganography developed in the future can be incorporated into the blockchain.
-Reverse decryption. A person (X) can try to obtain the digital keys through computational brutal force search. However, given that different inputs can lead to the same output with a hash function, the identified digital key Ix can be different from In. Even if Ix is by chance correct (Ix = In) and the person can fake some DNA keys, however, the DNA keys cannot produce the In when cross-referencing with other signature materials (figure 4A). For example, the DNA keys from X can reveal In only with counterfeit item-X, but not with authentic item-C ( figure 4B) . Similarly, the DNA keys from C can reveal In with item-C, but not with item-X. Therefore, the reverse decryption approach will have little impact on the safety of the DNA keys, as it cannot pass the cross-referencing test. In summary, I propose the design of a signature material by combining cryptographic hash function with DNA steganography. Both methods can generate highly complex and safe keys. While the DNA-based molecular keys can be physically connected to the item to be certificated, the digital keys associated with published hash values can make the recording system transparent and facilitate cross-referencing. Both digital key and DNA keys for a block is not limited to the SHA-2 functions (e.g. SHA-256 and SHA-512) and the DNA steganography 14 used in this paper as examples. Blocks could be cross-referenced, when author, collector, or third party uses the same DEC for different items. While the block chain will grow over time, new hash function and DNA steganography will be incorporated to improve the security over time. For example, in addition to primers and restriction enzymes as DNA keys, the CRISPR/Cas-based system could provide another attractive mechanism to enhance key complexity, by adding more layers of covering DNA, which can be removed specifically by CRISPR RNA sequence-dependent Cas trans-cleavage activity 12 .
Most importantly, the efficacy of P-D-H protocol is based on the combination of a physical object, an experimental procedure, and a digital key as a signature. Although automation has become increasingly used in biotechnology, often known as high throughput methods, their speeds lag far behind the silicon-based computations. Therefore, if a DNA steganography possesses the same bits as a digital cryptography, the DNA keys are much less vulnerable than the digital keys against brutal force search.
